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In RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 155
(Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky, eds., 2020)

PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF COMPLEMENTS
Lee Anne Fennell*
Resources often produce more value in combination than they do
separately: think of segments of a highway or parts of a machine. I argue that
property’s defining purpose is to group together complements, and that
property law and theory should focus on identifying and realizing valuable
bundles of resources. While some complementarities align with traditional
asset boundaries and can be protected by exclusion rights, realizing others
requires crossing or eschewing boundaries to recombine resources in ways
that further larger social, economic, or ecological objectives. The gains
associated with the entrenching and excluding functions of property thus vie
with the gains that come from breaking through those entrenchments to
reconfigure resources and rights. Conceptualizing property as
complementarity – a kind of bundling machine – allows both sorts of projects
to be accommodated within a common analytic structure. A law-ofcomplements view thus offers a new way to understand, in functional terms,
what is distinctive about property. Taking complementarity seriously also has
dramatic distributive implications, given that some of the most valuable
complementarities exist between human capital and property.
INTRODUCTION
What sort of institution is property? What is it good for? How does it
differ from other kinds of entitlements? This chapter suggests that
complementarity—the idea that some resources and entitlements produce
more value together than they do separately—offers a coherent way of
answering these questions. Seeing property as the law of complements
provides a way to harmonize standard economic efficiency considerations
with broader interests in promoting welfare and human flourishing. For
*

Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I thank the Harold J. Green
Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund for research support. I am grateful to Ken Ayotte,
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Law, in the 2019 Property Works in Progress conference, and in the 2019 Annual Meeting
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example, a focus on complementarity considers how specific resources work
together with human labor inputs to produce value—an inquiry that connects
questions of efficiency and distribution.
To thrive and flourish, human beings must put resources together into
useful packages, whether for purposes of consumption or production.1
Property law furthers this goal when it helps people assemble and protect sets
of complementary resources. This mission is complicated when keeping
existing complementarities intact (such as those that are present in a closeknit neighborhood) precludes realizing new complementarities (such as those
that exist between different segments of a planned highway). My claim is that
property as an institution must squarely confront and intelligently manage
such conflicts, which are pervasive in modern society. A law-ofcomplements approach shares common ground with Henry Smith’s
influential formulation of “property as the law of things,” which highlights
complementarities found within legally recognized things.2 But it also gives
equal weight to complementarities that span existing thing-boundaries.3
Notably, I reject any special privileging of the clusters of interests with
which property protections have traditionally been associated. There is no
natural or inevitable unit of property, but rather only contingently or
normatively connected sets of resources, rights, and attributes. On a welfarist
account, property’s project is to continually identify and realize those
packages of resources and rights that generate the most well-being in
combination. Nonwelfarist normative commitments may also mandate or
forbid certain forms of bundling or unbundling. For example,
antidiscrimination principles require that those opening their doors to the
public or putting housing on the market do so in a nondiscriminatory way
rather than slice access in any way they choose. Interests in dignity and
autonomy may likewise require that rights be provided in certain chunks or
configurations.4 Because a focus on complementarities turns attention to the
1

See, e.g., CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 58-63 (James Dingwall & Bert F.
Hoselitz trans., 1976); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 659 (1998).
2
See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012). For
a helpful discussion of Smith’s view and other variations on a law-of-things approach, see
generally Christopher Essert, Property in Licenses and the Law of Things, 59 MCGILL L.J.
559 (2014).
3
This distinction depends on how Smith, or others using a law-of-things approach, define
(and redefine) “things.” If the term “things” is meant to denote nothing more than “that
which is complementary” there is no difference between the approaches. It also bears
emphasis that Smith’s work recognizes a larger form of complementarity that manifests in
property as a system. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew Gold et al. eds., forthcoming); see
also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Architecture of Property (this volume).
4
For example, one way to understand the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion in State v.
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bases for grouping or splitting entitlements, it can accommodate a variety of
normative approaches and foster dialogue among them.
I do not maintain that every detail of property law boils down to the
management of complements. But complementarity features prominently in
the core problems that property has addressed and must address going
forward: When should entitlement holdings be protected in their current
patterns and when is it appropriate to disrupt those holdings to create new
patterns? What boundaries should property law recognize and how should it
defend (or override) them? Because these questions implicate collective
action problems and large-scale social projects, a law-of-complements
approach underscores that property is a public law field as well as a matter of
private law.5 The coercive power of the state comes into play not only to
define and enforce property rights, but also, and crucially, to configure them
and to assist in (or inhibit) their reconfiguration. Attention to complements
also serves to distinguish property from other kinds of entitlements, and can
sustain property’s distinctiveness as social, economic, and ecological
conditions change. Things may lose their current shapes, but
complementarities remain with us always.
To build my case for a law-of-complements approach, I start with
definitions, turn to the ways in which things group together complements,
and then examine how cross-boundary and inter-thing complements
complicate the story, with implications for both distribution and efficiency.
I. WHAT’S COMPLEMENTARY (AND WHY DO WE CARE)?
Property, I argue, is distinctively centered around facilitating and
protecting complementarities. But what do I mean by complementarities?
And why do they matter?
A. Defining Terms
Although economic definitions of complementarity vary, Peter Newman
offers this helpful take: “If x and y are complements in the rough everyday
sense, one would expect that as one has more y one would be willing to pay
more for a marginal unit of x, while if they are substitutes one would be
Shack is as an anti-slicing doctrine: the employer could not provide housing to workers
without also providing certain visiting rights. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
5
See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101
IOWA L. REV. 91, 134–35 (2015) (urging an “institutional turn” in property that would
integrate ideas from public and private law). Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Is Modern Tort Law
‘Private’?, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek
eds., 2020) (observing that to cast tort law as wholly private is to adopt a “pre-modern” view
of the subject).
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willing to pay less.”6 Two goods are complements in consumption, like left
and right shoes, if having both increases the consumption value one gets from
each. Two goods are complements in production, like a mortar and pestle, if
each increases the productivity of the other. Here, I define complementarity
broadly to encompass the related ideas of economies of scale and indivisible
(or “lumpy”) goods.7
For real property and other resources, complementarities are present
when the whole is greater than the sum of the parts—whether we are talking
about putting together more units of the same thing (like acres or years of
possession) or a set of different things (like pieces of a machine, parts of a
house, or the patent licenses necessary for a given product). If a particular
minimum scale is necessary in order to pursue a particular use (Stephen
Shmanske and Daniel Packey use the example of a golf course), the full
assembly is lumpy in delivering that form of use value.8 Likewise, a threshold
level of conservation or habitat preservation may be necessary to sustain a
fishery or an animal population; falling just a little short can mean a
devastating collapse.9
Perfect complements are valuable only when provided or used in
combination: segments of a bridge, for example. A good that is made up of
strongly complementary components is often considered “indivisible,” which
simply means that it is very difficult to divide or much less valuable when
divided.10 Complementarity is not always strict in this way; often putting
resources together yields more surplus than keeping them apart, but it is still
possible to derive value from the separately held elements. Determining
which resources and entitlements produce more value together and assessing
the strength of that complementarity is a crucial task for property.
B. Why Complements Matter
To see why complements matter to property, we first must consider why
property, as an institution, exists at all. For law and economics scholars, the

6

Peter Newman, Substitutes and Complements, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 13269, 13273 (3d ed., 2018); see also ANGUS DEATON & JOHN MUELLBAUER,
ECONOMICS AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 57 (1980).
7
On lumpy goods, see, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND
AGGREGATION IN LAW AND LIFE 8-26 (2019); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens,
Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD.
350, 353 (1982).
8
Stephen Shmanske & Daniel Packey, Lumpy Demand and the Diagrammatics of
Aggregation, 30 J. ECON. EDUC. 64, 72 (1999).
9
See, e.g., Taylor & Ward, supra note 7, at 357-58.
10
See H. Peyton Young, Dividing the Indivisible, 38 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 904, 904, 906 (1995).
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answer comes down to transaction costs.11 Property as we know it would be
altogether unnecessary if transaction costs were zero—a fact Ronald Coase
acknowledged.12 Instead, access to resources could be costlessly arranged
and rearranged moment by moment.13 It is only because transacting is costly
that the design of legal entitlements becomes important to efficiency. As
Yoram Barzel puts it, “[t]he presence of positive transaction costs is what
makes the study of property rights significant.”14 Accordingly, property law
is shaped by the pressures that positive transaction costs create.15
The assembly of complements overwhelmingly takes place unnoticed
through the ordinary workings of the market—think of everyday examples
like getting all four tires for your car or cream for your coffee. Even here,
property law plays a role—by defining and protecting entitlements in
resources so that people can trade over them in the marketplace, and by
supporting market structures that enable seamless transactions.16
Complementarities emerge as important phenomena where markets fail.17
Forestalling and working around such market failures, which are a product of
high transaction costs, is a core challenge for property law.
Property law’s concern for complementarities implies two basic yet often
contradictory moves: (1) strongly protecting sets of complements that take
the form of (or that can be conceptualized as) “things”; and (2) enabling the
assembly of new sets of complements. The second move is in tension with
the first when protecting existing property rights confers monopoly power
that blocks valuable reconfigurations. Property rights convey monopoly
power when an owned element is uniquely necessary to another party’s ends,
and the current owner has property rule protection that grants her a veto over
its transfer.18 Thus, strongly protecting rights in things can realize
complementarities, but it can also thwart them. In the next section, I explore
both halves of this proposition before turning to property’s optimal degree of
dynamism, and to questions of distribution.
11

See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 14-15 (1988) (agreeing with Steven
Cheung’s observation along these lines); see STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, WILL CHINA GO
‘CAPITALIST’? 37 (2d ed. 1986).
13
See Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV.
ECON. 145, 147-48 (2012); Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1471, 1491-92 & n.90 (2013)
14
YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 11 (2d ed. 1997).
15
See Henry E. Smith, Economics of Property Law, 2 OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE:
PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 152 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
16
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 13, at 1505, 1516-18 (discussing “transactability features”).
17
See, e.g., MENGER, supra note 1, at 64.
18
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (defining
property rules and distinguishing them from liability rules).
12
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II. COMPLEMENTS IN THINGS
In Smith’s “architectural” account, property’s structure represents a huge
“shortcut”19—one that proceeds by chunking the world into “legal things.”20
By operating in rem, property gives owners rights to things that are
automatically good against the world, in one fell swoop.21 Moreover,
property rights tend to be plenary by default, protecting a broad and
unspecified range of uses.22 This makes it unnecessary to list all the actions
that the owner is entitled to undertake on her property, much less require her
to separately negotiate for each one: to use her property as a place to take a
nap, read a book, eat a peach, and so on.23 Exclusion from well-defined things
also simplifies property rights: a broad-based “keep out” command is easier
to communicate, enforce, and obey than delineating and monitoring
particular behaviors.24 Lumping together entitlements into enduring thingshaped servings backed by exclusion incorporates all of these shortcuts while
adding temporal durability to the mix. Things thus help to auto-fill the who,
what, how, and when of resource access rights.
This shortcut-based structure has clear advantages over a fanciful system
of fully specified, individually sliced entitlements that govern each action by
every person.25 Although some of the claimed information-cost advantages
associated with a law-of-things view of property are contestable26 or not
unique to property law,27 one advantage is crucial to the vision of property I
19

Smith, supra note 2, at 1692-94.
See Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055,
2065 (2015).
21
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean,
54 J. L. & ECON. S77, S90-S91 (2011).
22
See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 72 (1997).
23
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relationship Between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009).
24
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327-29 (1993);
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965,
978-83 (2004); see also Robert D. Sack, Human Territoriality: A Theory, 73 ANNALS ASS’N
AM. GEOGRAPHERS 55, 58 (1983) (“Territoriality can be easy to communicate because it
requires only one kind of marker or sign—the boundary.”).
25
Smith, supra note 2, at 1693; see Lee & Smith, supra note 13, at 152.
26
For example, an exclusion-based system of private property may not convey helpful
information to people who are uncertain whether particular lands are private or public, and
hence whether their entry is prohibited or allowed. See Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, The
Fault of Trespass, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 48, 59 (2015).
27
For example, property’s in rem rights avoid the costs of naming every person to whom
they apply, see, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at S99, but this does not distinguish
property from, say, criminal law (where the law need not list all the people one is not to
murder).
20
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pursue here: the capacity of things to group together complementary
elements and attributes. Well-defined things put together—and help keep
together—packages that enable people to make more valuable use of
resources. As Smith observes, “[c]ertain collections of attributes go together”
and these “[c]omplementary resource attributes are collected into things or
assets.”28 There are two efficiency shortcuts in the picture.
First, putting (or keeping) complementary resources together in the same
hands tends to advance allocative efficiency, regardless of whose hands those
might be. By defining sets of complements, property keeps owners from
having to seek and out assemble these complements on their own.29 If the
value of each entitlement or subcomponent were completely independent,
then grouping them together would not be expected to reduce the need for
transactions, since no one would be any more likely than anyone else to value
a given attribute or right more highly. But due to complementarities, the
person who most highly values a given entitlement is often the one who
already holds closely related entitlements.
Second, once aggregated together, these complementary sets of
entitlements are easy to transact over all at once, if someone else values the
full set more highly.30 Thus, things not only package together components
that are more valuable in combination, but also simplify moving them intact
into the hands of the highest valuing user.
Complementarity explains how designating an owner as the residual
claimant of an asset (or thing) generates gains: by incentivizing the kinds of
actions that will make an entire assembly of property attributes work best
together.31 Absent this interaction among attributes and entitlements, often
extended over lengthy periods, ownership stops looking like an institutional
solution and becomes just a way of describing purely additive wealth
holdings. It is the management of interactions among resources, as well as
between owned resources and human labor and skill, that makes property
interesting and makes its institutional design consequential. And those
interactions are shot through with complementarities.
Significantly, some of these complementarities exist in the dimension of
time and interact with another argument for property rights: the
internalization of costs and benefits. Because property ownership persists, it
motivates people to invest in the property by visiting upon them the negative

28

Smith, supra note 15, at 153; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 1693.
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 15, at 153.
30
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at S79-80 (explaining that Coase’s work “has
underscored the importance of concentrating ownership of property in a way that facilitates
transfer”).
31
See BARZEL, supra note 14, at 78-80; see also Smith, supra note 15, at 154-55.
29

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3500137

8

Fennell

[19-Jan-21

or positive effects of their acts or omissions.32 This amounts to a temporal
bundling of complements—between possession today and possession
tomorrow. Legally recognized things group entitlements into strongly
complementary bundles, which can promote both allocative efficiency (to the
extent it helps get sets of entitlements together, in the right hands) and
dynamic or investment efficiency (by enabling and motivating people to
make the most of stably held sets of resources).33
Complementarities also surface in the legal construction of things. As
work on the theory of the firm emphasizes, it is essential that the inputs that
represent perfect complements in a given value-production process remain
available for simultaneous use. If I need both Input A and Input B to make
my product, I need to ensure the availability of both; Input B becomes
valueless in my hands unless I can get hold of Input A as well. This, of course,
is the source of well-rehearsed hold-up problems, one solution to which
involves consolidating ownership over complementary productive assets in
the same hands.34 In fact, it is not necessary to consolidate ownership in the
same hands if access or coordination can be accomplished in another way—
a fact that opens the door to creative new institutional solutions.35 Regardless,
the successful assembly of complements through some means lies at the core
of property’s mission of enabling people to derive value from resources.
Likewise, the boundaries of land holdings can be drawn in ways that
reflect economies and diseconomies of scale—instances in which the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts, or vice versa.36 Just as firms are defined
based on the relative costs of arranging transactions within boundaries and
across boundaries, so too should property lines reflect when the grouping of
components within one ownership envelope produces more benefits than
costs.37 For example, less total fencing is required overall if parcels are larger,
but managing what lies inside the fence becomes more costly.38
Complementarity seems easiest to appreciate where there is a need to put
32

See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
356 (1967).
33
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at S90.
34
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
35
See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON.
387 (1998); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 353 (1991).
36
See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 1332-35; Demsetz, supra note 32, at 357-58.
37
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at S93-S94.
38
See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, Private and Common Property Rights, in 5
PROPERTY LAW AND ECONOMICS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 53, 64
(Boudewijn Bouckaer ed., 2d ed. 2010); Ellickson, supra note 24, at 1332-34.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3500137

19-Jan-21]

PROPERTY COMPLEMENTS

9

together a set of factors (acres, machines, and so on), but it also surfaces in
indivisible goods. The parts of many ordinary goods are perfect complements
in that removing one makes the remainder useless. For example, imagine that
an individual owns a Widgetmaker, a specialized machine that spits out
widgets. Assuming the other inputs that make a Widgetmaker work (oil,
water, polymers, and so on) can be readily accessed on the open market, there
might appear to be no notable complementarities in the picture. But that’s just
because we haven’t yet considered what it would mean for the Widgetmaker
(and its owner) if someone removed a small cog that is integral to the
machine’s operation and repurposed it for a craft project.
Property rights operating in the background keep this possibility and
others like it from surfacing. Exclusion protects the Widgetmaker as an intact
entity, so its complementarities attract no notice. The property rights that the
Widgetmaker’s owner will gain in the widgets themselves incentivize her to
keep all of the machine’s parts together and operating. One way to
understand the role of exclusion in this story is to posit some degree of
noninterference as complementary to widget production. Getting the
participation of the machine’s operator, who contributes labor to the
production process, is also essential. Property provides a structure for
bringing all these elements together to produce value. And while some of the
relevant complementarities are found within things, others are not.
III. COMPLEMENTS BEYOND THINGS
All things (that we continue to recognize as such) contain complements.
But not all complementarities are found within what we might reasonably
regard as things. Some complementarities require breaking open existing
things so that parts of each can be assembled together. Often, keeping inputs
within one complementary set makes the building of another complementary
set impossible, and vice versa. How should property law deal with this
pervasive situation?
A. Modifying Things
One possibility is to treat thinghood as a relatively stable starting point
for understanding property’s workings but to recognize that some
modifications are necessary around the edges where especially compelling
cross-boundary issues are at stake. Smith seems to embrace this approach,
recognizing uncontroversial examples such as airplane overflights and
antidiscrimination law as refinements to a thing-based model.39 Both of these
39

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 1719; Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at S96. Another
exception that Smith mentions, the doctrine of necessity, implicates a facet of
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examples involve strong cross-boundary complementarities. In the case of
overflights, there is the lumpy good of unimpeded air travel that can only be
achieved if landowners are stripped of their right to exclude aircraft from
passing through their airspace at high altitudes.40 The different pieces of a
given route are perfect complements, the type that is very difficult to
assemble for reasons relating to monopoly power and holdouts.41
Antidiscrimination law can be understood similarly. The important social
project of making access to property nondiscriminatory cannot be achieved
piecemeal. Again, there is a complementarity in play. If we seek to create a
society in which one’s status as a member of a protected class does not inflict
systemic disadvantages,42 then antidiscrimination law must also be applied
system-wide, rather than just here and there. In addition to an overarching
complementarity between property access and the development of human
capital, certain facets of that property access are themselves complementary.
Consider accessibility requirements for people with disabilities. For a
person who uses a wheelchair to run errands, attend work or school, and get
to and from her home each day, it is important that all parts of her daily route
be accessible to her. If half the intersections have curb cuts and half do not,
or if half the buildings she needs to enter have accessible entrances and half
do not, it is not half as good; it is wholly unworkable.43 Having the ability to
freely navigate a city is similar to having the ability to travel along a particular
airline route: having it all is very important. A similar point can be made
about efforts to combat segregation, which require that all groups have free
access to all neighborhoods, not just certain ones.
If we recognize that thinghood is contingent—that the package of rights
an owner has depends, or ought to depend, on what competing or conflicting
packages of complements are most important to human well-being or to
society’s core normative commitments—then it becomes less true that
prepackaged things produce transaction cost savings by making it
complementarity discussed below. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. Smith’s work
has also emphasized the need for governance mechanisms to address spillovers, a topic I take
up in Part IV.C.2.
40
On the development of airplane overflight rights, see generally STUART BANNER, WHO
OWNS THE SKY? (2008).
41
See, e.g., Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Holdout in the Assembly of Complements:
A Problem for Market Design, 102 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proc.) 360 (2012). See also
Henry E. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, in 10 MODERN STUDIES IN
PROPERTY LAW (Ben McFarlane & Sinéad Agnew eds., 2019) (emphasizing the lack of
complementarity between the landowner’s other rights and airspace rights).
42
See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357
(2017).
43
See David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 47, 98 (2009) (discussing the possibility that accessibility features could have network
effects).
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unnecessary to compose valuable packages of complementary interests.44
Moreover, we now have to confront another problem that is made worse by
the privileging of pre-existing things: the difficulty of assembling from many
separate owners the entitlements necessary to form these new and vitally
important complementary packages.
B. Things Get in the Way
Making things the unit of analysis for property entitlements is a doubleedged sword when it comes to transaction costs. If things are defined in a
compositionally enduring way, then they must be broken open somehow in
order to form new things when circumstances change and different
complementarities become more valuable. Here we confront a type of
transaction cost that property’s architecture exacerbates: strategic holdout (or
holdup) behavior.45 By design, an exclusion-based system backed with
property rule protection makes reconfiguration difficult. Yet
reconfigurability is perhaps the most important attribute for a modern
property system to possess.
Pressure comes from two directions. First, interdependence among
property interests is far greater in the twenty-first century than it was in the
agrarian past. Creating valuable urban agglomerations and solving largescale ecological problems requires packages of entitlements that cut across
traditional boundaries. Second, the significance of owning enduring things
over time has diminished, as new ways of delivering streams of access on
demand have taken hold. Due to the convergence of these two trends,
complementarities between and among separately owned entitlements are
rapidly eclipsing those within existing entitlement packages.
If existing things no longer represent the most valuable combinations of
resources, exclusion rights that protect existing compositions now enable a
party with monopoly power to hold out. Holdouts are problematic for two
reasons. First, they can keep resource reconfigurations from going forward
when they should, as a matter of efficiency, do so. This can happen when a
monopolist—or multiple monopolists holding separate pieces of a larger
would-be assembly—misgauges how much of the available assembly surplus
she can extract, and winds up killing a deal that would have been valuable for
all involved. A second, more subtle problem is that holdout dynamics can
dramatically increase the time and trouble required to reach a deal, even if
one is eventually completed. In some cases the costs of making a deal and the
uncertainty surrounding its successful completion can discourage would-be
44

Cf. Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183
(2017).
45
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 15, at 166; Heller, supra note 1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3500137

12

Fennell

[19-Jan-21

assemblers from even attempting valuable assemblies.46
The shape of the problem is clear. Property’s architecture sequesters
complementary resources behind exclusionary walls along with their positive
and negative effects to enable and motivate owners to generate value from
using them in combination. The higher and more impenetrable the wall, the
better this works. But when unique complements are found on opposite sides
of the wall, and must be brought together in the same hands to produce value,
the height and impenetrability of the walls become liabilities rather than
assets. Thinking of property as bound up in enabling valuable
complementarities illuminates both halves of this story. It makes vivid a
tension lurking in property’s very design: that between protecting existing
entitlements and enabling new combinations.47
C. Is There a Really a Conflict?
Significantly, the tension just identified does not surface so long as
existing legal things continue to be the most important repositories of
compositional value. To the extent this is the case, building property to be
highly change-resistant would not have the drawbacks I have suggested
because it would continue to instantiate lasting, important complementarities
without thwarting the realization of any more valuable nascent ones. This
seems implausible as a categorical matter, although certainly there is room
for debate about how much value we are leaving on the table by making
property so inertial.
Another way of reconciling between- and within-thing complementarities
is to suggest that the kinds of interests that require the reconfiguration of
rights (e.g., antidiscrimination law and overflights) are so rare and involve
such obviously crucial societal interests that they simply do not implicate the
sort of recompositional concerns I am raising. Such reconfigurations can be
pursued without holdout problems through the coercive force of law—as
indeed was the case in the two examples cited. Put differently, the claim
might be that existing things should be maintained as intact packages of
entitlements, subject only to voluntary deal-making, unless and until a
competing interest emerges that is so overwhelming as to justify widespread
legal coercion.
This approach quickly turns circular, however. If we can coercively
46

See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Roderick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1472-74 (2008).
47
Often this plays out as a conflict between investment efficiency (associated with protecting
existing holdings) and allocative efficiency (associated with moving entitlements to higher
valuing users). See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only Another Name for
Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 51 (2017).
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reconfigure property rights when it is important enough to do so, how should
we decide when that is? Smith cites the adoption of the right to roam in
England and Scotland as an example of problematically cavalier rebundling
of property, although he does not take a stand on whether such a right should
or should not be recognized.48 Notably, a right to roam involves a form of
complementarity similar to that of a highway: travel paths are far more
valuable when they are complete and unbroken. Empirical work showing that
owners suffer a property value loss from the right to roam is interesting but
incomplete.49 If impinging on the right to exclude completes one valuable
assembly at the expense of disrupting another (the disproportionate gains that
come from a complete rather than broken exclusion right), then both sets of
complements must be considered.
Another way to dodge the conflict between within- and between-thing
complementarities would be to bake complementarity into thing-definition
and continually redefine things as needed to capitalize on the most valuable
complementarities. But this way of proceeding makes the invocation of
thinghood both unnecessary and confusing. If complementarity is what we’re
really after, we should simply say so.
IV. OPTIMAL DYNAMISM IN PROPERTY
What is really at stake in calibrating the ease of reconfigurability is the
appropriate degree of dynamism in property. Neither infinite mutability nor
complete rigidity is desirable. To see how a law-of-complements approach
might aim for optimal dynamism, it is helpful to see how it differs not only
from a law-of-things account but also from a vision of property as a “bundle
of rights” or “bundle of sticks”—a metaphor popularized by the Legal
Realists and later adopted by some law and economics scholars.50 A law-ofcomplements view falls in between these two approaches, adding structure to
the bundle view and flexibility to the thing view.
A. Things, Bundles, Events
Smith’s law-of-things approach to property is explicitly framed in
opposition to the bundle-of-rights view. His objection to the bundle metaphor
48

Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the Cathedral: Making Law and Economics More
Calabresian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43, 49 (2019).
49
Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical
Assessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2017).
50
On the history and use of the bundle metaphor, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365-66
(2001); Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the
Property Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 194-201 (2011).
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relates to its malleability and hyper-contingency; he criticizes bundle
proponents for assuming “that the bundle is maximally protean and easily
reformable.”51 Unconcerned with complementarities, the bundle view lacks
the “glue” to keep useful attributes together.52 Indeed, in characterizing this
view, Smith sometimes dispenses with the term bundle itself, referring
instead to a “heap” or “collection” of rights.53
There is a contradiction buried in Smith’s critique of the bundle view. If
it is the contingency of the bundle model that makes it unacceptable, then
thinghood must be conceptualized in a manner that is considerably less
contingent. Things must cohere and endure, and not be vulnerable to being
pulled apart and reconstituted at will. But if what makes things powerful is
their capacity to group together complements, then their value depends on
how well they actually manage to do so. Because complementarities are
inherently contingent, a static and contingency-resistant thing-based vision
of property cannot consistently capture them.
This does not mean the bundle view gets things right. Although adherents
to that approach presumably occupy a wide spectrum of positions, it is
probably not unfair to associate at least some of them with skepticism about
property’s distinctiveness as a field, as well as a belief that an open-ended allthings-considered inquiry is an appropriate way to resolve conflicts over
resources. Such an unstructured view avoids privileging existing things, but
it also provides no basis for deciding when and how to pull them apart. Can
a vision of property step back from that approach without losing the
flexibility to pursue new complementarities?
One way to approach the problem is to redefine thinghood in terms of
activities, subtly shifting property’s discourse from the realm of things to the
realm of events.54 Smith’s own work hints at this move when he invokes
network theory and machine learning—an approach where the goal is to
identify patterns of interactions using a system that does not “prejudge”
where the most intense interactions will occur.55 This method of inquiry
leaves open the possibility that across-thing interactions would turn out to be
more intense.56 If so, one might continually redefine a thing based on where
51

Smith, supra note 48, at 49.
See Smith, supra note 20, at 2066.
53
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 41 (describing the bundle view as envisioning “a heap of
detachable rules” or “a collection of rights, privileges, duties, and so on”).
54
See, e.g., Christopher M. Newman, Using Things, Defining Property, in PROPERTY
THEORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 69, 90 (James Penner & Michael Otsuka
eds., 2018) (defining a thing, in the context of property theory, “as a discrete and intelligible
nexus of human activity with respect to which actions by different persons are likely to come
into conflict”).
55
Smith, supra note 15, at 153-54; see also Smith, supra note 48, at 51-52.
56
See Smith, supra note 48, at 52; Smith, supra note 15, at 153-54.
52
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the most intense interactions occur. But how can one make such an
assessment if property law itself limits what interactions are even possible?57
Nonetheless, a focus on events offers an important input into the
construction of some legal things. Consider the setting of real property
boundaries. Here, we see that property draws lines not around things but
rather around events—sets of actions and effects involving resources. Robert
Ellickson captures this insight in his discussion of efficient scale, when he
speaks of small, medium, and large events.58 According to this account,
property is not about controlling things, but rather about managing events.
Things come into the mix only because some bundles of control work better
at managing events than others—that is, because of complementarities.
B. Complements and Change
Although things can be made more dynamic by grounding them in
activities and events, an explicit focus on complements offers more traction.
Not only can a law-of-complements framework recognize how existing
holdings capture interactions and events, it also can identify places where
new assemblies add value. And it confronts head-on the design challenge
introduced earlier: how to protect existing combinations without thwarting
value-enhancing reconfigurations.
A first step is to identify the relevant dimensions along which
complementarities differ. One such dimension is whether the complements
are perfect, in that each is useless without all the others. This dimension
matters because it determines the degree of monopoly power in play. Where
complementary components have substitutes or where not all of the pieces
must be assembled in order for the assembly to produce value, no single
owner possesses meaningful holdout power, and markets are more likely to
enable resource reconfigurations that will add value.59
A second dimension is the amount of social value that can be derived
from the new assembly, relative to the old. Of course, we are typically unsure
on this score, unless market transactions can reveal the answer. Often they
cannot, for two basic reasons. One is that where complementarities are strict
(that is, the components are perfect complements, or very nearly so),
monopoly power can keep a market transaction from occurring even when it
would generate more value. For example, a blocked land assembly that
results from entitlement holders who truly have high valuations of their
57

Cf. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1095, 1138-40 (2007) (explaining that it may be necessary to break property laws to show
what an alternative regime looks like and providing the example of lunch-counter sit-ins).
58
Ellickson, supra note 24, at 1325-35.
59
See, e.g., Kominers & Weyl, supra note 41.
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parcels (“holdins”)60 is observationally equivalent to one involving parcel
owners who are acting as strategic holdouts. A coercive solution that cuts
through stratagems may unwittingly destroy value if the original
configuration was the more valuable one.
Second, liquidity problems, imperfect capital markets, and free rider
problems can keep the more valuable assembly from coming about even
when holdouts do not block the way. This can be especially problematic
where human capital is part of a complementary set, given well-known
difficulties in tapping into future earnings.61 Difficulty also emerges when a
large number of people stand to gain from the new arrangement and there is
no way to aggregate their willingness to pay for it. A political solution (and
associated coercion) is one possibility, but for reasons well-rehearsed
elsewhere may generate both false negatives and false positives in producing
new assemblies—some assemblies that would be valuable are not completed,
while others that are completed may prove less valuable than the preexisting
sets of complements that were coercively disrupted.
Nonetheless, examining these parameters helps reveal places where
markets are likely to fail at the task of reconfiguration in ways that seriously
threaten human well-being—as well as instances where disrupting existing
complementarities is likely to have devastating consequences. Mechanism
design can help create property structures that detect and adjust for these
conditions, whether by eliciting valuation information from entitlement
holders, or setting triggering conditions for certain kinds of reconfigurations.
Rather than privileging existing sets of complements or engaging in episodic
acts of coercion to break them apart, methods for facilitating entitlement
rearrangement in light of shifting complementarities should be made part of
the warp and woof of property law itself. Property, in short, should be
designed for optimal reconfigurability.
C. Reconfigurable by Design
Property law today falls far short of optimal dynamism, and many design
challenges remain. Yet the idea of building in reconfigurability is not alien to
property, and existing doctrines provide footholds for expanding attention to
complementarities. Some concrete examples will help to illustrate.
1. Accession
Consider the doctrine of accession, the law’s habit of assigning new
60

Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and
Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 128-29 (2004).
61
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 102–04 (1962).
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things to the person who already owns a related thing: the calf to the owner
of the mother cow, and the crops to the owner of the field. 62 While it would
be possible to describe this move as simply expanding the scope of a given
“thing,” it is more naturally understood as a choice about the allocation of an
entirely new thing.63 Although a variety of rationales might be mustered for
it, complementarity provides a compelling one: If the calf will generally do
best when kept with its mother, and if the crops will generally do best when
rooted in the ground, having the same person act as owner of both is likely to
generate more value than granting the new thing to a separate owner.64
Thomas Merrill makes a related point in observing that “the most
prominently connected owner is likely to have specialized or local knowledge
or skills relevant to developing the resource.”65 Here, the complementarity
runs between the owner’s skill set (honed on the existing resource) and the
new, related resource.
Complementarity features even more prominently in accession cases
involving mistaken improvers. Here, one party mistakenly appropriates some
property of another and incorporates it into her own new creation—for
example, by accidentally building over a property line.66 Once the mistake is
discovered, returning everyone to their previous positions may be impossible
or prohibitively costly. The reason boils down to indivisibilities: a house that
is built over a property line cannot be readily disaggregated from the bit of
unowned land on which it sits, nor can the over-the-line part of the house be
readily split from the part that sits legally on the owner’s parcel. Similarly,
logs that have been turned into hoops, or old cars that have been painstakingly
restored, cannot simply be put back as they were.67 A solution that respects
complementarity in the new things that have been created will tend to keep
them intact, and settle up as needed using the divisible medium of money.68
These legal solutions show property law’s willingness to suspend the
62

See Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459,
464-67 (2009) (discussing these and other “traditional examples”); id. at 468-73 (discussing
examples involving intangibles, and examples in which following the principle of accession
is contested).
63
See id. at 481 (resisting the idea that accession merely changes the scope of ownership,
given that it is “often applied to determine the ownership of objects that are most naturally
regarded as being separate or distinct from the thing that supplies the basis for accession,
such as baby animals, minerals underground, or screenplays for movies”).
64
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1328 (2014). A closely
related justification is cost internalization. See Merrill, supra note 62, at 484-85.
65
Merrill, supra note 62, at 489.
66
For discussion and analysis of this type of accession, see Yun-chien Chang, An Economic
and Comparative Analysis of Specificatio (the Accession Doctrine), 39 EUR. J.L. & ECON.
225 (2015).
67
See id. at 226-27 (discussing these and other examples, drawing on case law).
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owner’s veto power over owned entitlements where compelling
complementarities are present. Where the underlying physical components
have already been recombined by mistake and putting things back as they
were would cost too much, legal entitlements will be realigned to match the
new physical configuration.69 Such examples of property’s dynamic potential
might seem far removed from questions about whether to allow a right to
roam or facilitate a new assembly of land. Yet on reflection, the only real
distinction is that the recombination has already been realized in a physical
sense in one case and not in the other; the law must still decide in each case
whether to realign the underlying entitlements.
It might seem especially wasteful to tear asunder what has already been
put together. But failing to put a more valuable assembly together in the first
place can also generate great losses.70 We also want people to use market
processes to create new combinations where possible. Yet the mistaken
improver cases show us that property law will readily toss aside that
requirement where monopoly power is likely to be great—that is, where the
house has already been built over the line, and now the builder has to
negotiate with the landowner for the right to stay there.71 Essentially identical
monopoly problems can also impede as-yet-unrealized assemblies.
2. Spillovers
Property’s dynamism can also be detected in a wide range of measures
aimed at addressing spillovers of various sorts. Spillovers qualify the thingbased vision of property because they cross module boundaries.72 One
response is simply to resize the parcel to contain the spillovers, although there
are drawbacks to this approach.73 Other options involve governance
mechanisms such as “easement, contract, nuisance, or regulation,” or creating
new forms of “entity property” such as common interest communities “to
govern the wider interaction.”74 Spillover control can be understood as
69

I focus here on mistaken (i.e., good faith) scenarios; bad faith improvers are treated more
harshly under the common law. See id.
70
Cf. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1222, 1265-72 (2009) (critiquing the law’s greater protection of existing uses
compared with as-yet-unrealized ones).
71
The fact thatgood substitute sites are likely to be available to the improver before she starts
building provides a rationale for allowing only good faith improvers to benefit from a forced
entitlement shift. That is, the physical realignment itself is what creates the potential holdup problem.
72
See Smith, supra note 15, at 166.
73
For example, commentators have observed that broader ownership means less
specialization. See, e.g., id. at 159 (citing Ellickson, supra note 24, at 1322-35); BARZEL,
supra note 14, at 51-52.
74
Smith, supra note 15, at 159.
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aligning incentives (internalizing costs and benefits) but it can also be cast as
securing a complement to productive use of property. For example, if
producing the good of residential living requires some degree of peace and
quiet, or the absence of noise and fumes, then control over the adjacent areas
represents an entitlement that complements the homeowner’s own property
interests.
Nuisance law might secure these complements on a case-by-case basis,75
but other land use controls sweep more broadly to control activities
throughout a specified neighborhood or zone. If it is important for everyone
in a given area to refrain from a particular practice in order for significant
value to be realized, then everyone’s forbearance must be somehow
assembled. Notably, many spillover solutions are consciously structured in
ways that sidestep holdout problems. For example, zoning is a political
solution that reallocates entitlements from the individual landowner to the
community coercively, without the need for unanimous consent.76 Common
interest communities enable people to opt in through purchase decisions,
agreeing to be bound by a governance regime that does not require unanimous
consent to make changes.77
Finally, attention to complementarities among land uses can spotlight
instances in which they are absent. For example, it may be unnecessary to
keep a particular type of activity out of an area altogether, or it may be
desirable to mix certain kinds of uses together.78
3. Accommodating Multiple Complementarities
Although competing sets of complements raise some of the most
important challenges in property law, sometimes two sets of complements
are not mutually exclusive, but can instead be accommodated simultaneously,
seasonally, or in some other pattern. Consider the example of medieval
common fields, which were open to the community for grazing during part
of the year, but seasonally farmed as individual holdings.79 Each landowner
75

Whether or not it does so in a given case depends not only on whether an actionable
nuisance is found, but also on the remedy provided.
76
For the characterization of zoning as a collective property right, see, e.g., ROBERT H.
NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 15-18 (1977); William A. Fischel, Equity and
Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL’Y 301, 302 (1979).
77
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 848-49
(2004).
78
See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 152–77 (1961)
(discussing the benefits of mixed uses); NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY 49–
76 (2010) (discussing and critiquing Jacobs’s ideas).
79
See generally Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open
Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131–69 (2000).
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held a collection of small strips of land dispersed throughout the field, which
provided a way of combatting strategic behavior and diversifying risk.80
Here, economies of scale could be realized through larger grazing areas
without disrupting seasonal crop-growing that was capable of matching up
inputs and outcomes at a much smaller physical scale.
A present-day approach that can accommodate competing
complementarities is land readjustment, an approach that has been commonly
used in a number of countries.81 This mechanism comes in many variations,
but the core idea is to facilitate land reconfigurations that make a redeveloped
area more valuable, while granting residents the right to stay in the newly
reconfigured area. Such an approach can assemble new complements, such
as higher density housing that can support nearby retail and transit, while
preserving the complementarity that already exists in a tight-knit
neighborhood. Finding innovative ways to accommodate what might at first
appear to be incompatible sets of complements represents an important
research direction for property scholars.
4. Managing Mixed Regimes
Another persistent and growing challenge for property law is managing
the abutments between privately and commonly owned elements. 82 Mixed
property regimes are ubiquitous, with commonly held elements pervasively
threaded through private entitlements.83 Complementarities and economies
of scale explain why it is not possible to reduce all entitlements to individual
private ownership—think of large and lumpy infrastructure, or ecological
systems that operate at a landscape level.84 Private owners may exploit and
degrade these resources to benefit their own holdings. Converting more
resources to common ownership can address this incentive problem—for
example, a communal pasture will not be overgrazed if the cows are also

80

See id. at 146-54; Donald N. McCloskey, The Open Fields of England: Rent, Risk, and the
Rate of Interest, 1300–1815, in MARKETS IN HISTORY: ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE PAST 5
(David W. Galenson ed., 1989).
81
See, e.g., ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
(Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007).
82
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 37-40, fig. 2.1 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right
Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 23-24 (1973).
83
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons
in Market Economies, 80 U CHI. L. REV. 1499 (2013) (book review).
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See, e.g., LEWIS D. HOPKINS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LOGIC OF MAKING PLANS 28
(2001); Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level
Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015).
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owned in common.85 But because labor inputs remain under private control,
a shirking problem may take its place.86
Although the interface between private and common ownership cannot
be avoided, attention to complements can help in designing ways to manage
it. For example, Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess discuss Swiss villages
that prohibited cattle owners from sending more cows to the pasture than they
could support on hay produced on their own land during the winter season.87
Here, a private complement to cattle-keeping, hay production, serves as a
rationing device. If year-round cattle ownership exploits temporal economies
of scale, this rule may impose relatively few burdens on private owners, while
building in a check on overgrazing the commons. The broader lesson is that
complementarities and economies of scale can be creatively leveraged to
address collective action problems.
5. Public Goods and New Modes of Access
Complementarities also feature in the private provision of public goods—
nonrival and nonexcludable goods such as lighthouses that we might expect
markets to undersupply. One strategy to effectively price access to a public
good involves metering access to a complementary good (using port access
fees for ships to fund lighthouses, for example).88 Similarly, paid parking
lots are often used to meter access to otherwise free events, and a special glass
or mug might be sold at a wine or beer festival to grant access to libations.
Significant too are constructed and enforced forms of complementarity, such
as consumer electronics that cease to function without continual software
updates or other ongoing interactions with vendors.89 If the continued
usefulness of a product depends on a component that another party controls,
this presents the risk of a hold-up situation—a design challenge for property.
As technology enables us to divide up assets in new ways, slivers of ondemand access can create new complementary sets—a stream of benefits that
stands in for the old-fashioned temporal complementarity of constant asset
ownership. These new arrangements offer opportunities (cheaper access to
assets, access to better assets, access to more variety, fewer storage burdens),
as well as risks and costs associated with breaking up the traditional
ownership bundle (externalities, changes in regulatory oversight).90 Finding
85

See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 82, at 23-24.
See id.
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Ostrom & Hess, supra note 38, at 65.
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See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357, 362 (1974); Rosolino
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the combinations that produce real improvements in total value—and not just
as a function of offloading costs onto third parties—represents an important
focus for property law.
6. Assembly Problems, Old and New
Perhaps the largest and most diverse category of property problems
implicating complementarity involves the assembly of entitlements.
Sometimes these assemblies involve perfect complements, which combine to
produce “lumpy” or “single-step” goods in which having all the pieces is
essential. In both intellectual property and real property contexts, concerns
have surfaced about holdout problems blocking efficient assemblies. These
concerns, and rebuttals to them, have been well-aired elsewhere. What is
most important to emphasize here is the generalizability of the entitlement
assembly concern and its relevance for property theory and doctrine.
Whether we are talking about putting together contributions to achieve a
social goal like curing a disease, increments of forbearance to avoid an
ecological disaster, pieces of habitat sufficient to make up a wildlife corridor,
segments of beachfront to create a contiguous shoreline path, or parcels of
land sufficient to build a highway or other large piece of infrastructure, the
problem is the same: putting together inputs that are held separately. What
must be assembled in each case is the cooperation of those who hold these
crucial components—or coercion to override the lack of such cooperation.
Finding mechanisms to achieve the former and setting criteria for the latter
are not one-off or unusual situations; they are recurring features of property
law, and among its greatest challenges.
V. DISTRIBUTION AND COMPLEMENTARITY
Although a focus on complementarity connects to standard efficiency
concerns, taking it seriously also has distributive implications. While
distribution is a deep concern of many property scholars, the idea of bringing
these considerations squarely into the domain of a welfarist analysis through
attention to complementarity has not received much attention. One reason
relates to the tendency in law and economics to artificially separate questions
of efficiency (making the pie larger) from questions of distribution (dividing
the pie), and to assume that distributive issues can be best addressed through
a tax and transfer mechanism.91
91

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying
the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
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Complementarity adds an important wrinkle: if resources become more
valuable depending on how they are matched up with people’s skills,
abilities, and labor inputs, then questions of resource distribution bear directly
on the efficiency of property arrangements. When it is not possible to match
up labor with other resources in appropriate combinations, economic loss
results.92 For example, Carl Menger describes conditions under which large
amounts of grain would simply “spoil on the fields” because “the goods
complementary to the crops standing on the fields (the labor services
necessary for harvesting them) are missing.”93 When people do not have
access to the complementary resources that would, combined with their own
labor, produce value, we are likely to see metaphorical instances of grain
spoiling on the fields in many domains. Standard economic analysis would
suggest that a person who can use a resource more productively would have
a higher willingness to pay for it, and would therefore acquire it without any
need for intervention. But people often lack liquidity, and capital markets do
not reliably supply it.
Recognizing these points and their distributive implications becomes
especially important in light of an amassing tendency that is baked into
property law itself. As Merrill explains, “[b]ecause of the principle of
accession, regressive distribution is hard-wired into the very operation of a
system of private property.”94 The result is a “built-in multiplier effect that
means owners of property continually get more property.”95 Some of these
regressive tendencies stem from accommodating complementarities, as we
saw in the case of accession’s rules for assigning ownership of crops and baby
animals. But property’s amassing tendencies can also get in the way of
making better matches between resources and human capital. This is true at
a most basic level, as we can see in the following observation by Jeremy
Waldron: “Everything that is done has to be done somewhere.”96 This reality
makes access to real property a perfect complement to every human endeavor
and activity, including those acts essential to sustaining life itself.97
The larger project of how property might best address distribution cannot
be tackled here, but the distributive implications of taking complementarity
seriously are dramatic. Work decades ago recognized the importance of
enabling human capital to be combined with other forms of capital.98 Recent
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work examining how people can leverage their way of out poverty traps
likewise stresses the significance of enabling people to access the right
combinations of resources at a sufficient scale at the appropriate time.99
Grounding these discussions in complementarity offers a way to carry the
conversation forward within property theory.
CONCLUSION
Property faces an identity crisis. It is torn between the forms of the past,
which emphasize stability, and the challenges of the future, which require
mutability. I have suggested that grounding property in complementarity
provides a way to take seriously the ways that property’s architecture has
operated in the past to generate value, while taking equally seriously the ways
that architecture can run aground in an interconnected world. A law-ofcomplements approach provides a flexible, modern, and meaningful answer
to the question of what makes property distinctive. It keeps the production of
value center stage by focusing on how property, as an institution, enables and
protects combinations of resources—with other resources and with human
skill, labor, and ingenuity. This reorientation frees us to think creatively about
questions of both efficiency and distribution in designing institutions aimed
at optimizing resource access.
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